Even though Roe was no longer pregnant, the Court rejected claims that the case was moot, arguing that she might become pregnant again and that other women similarly situated would become pregnant. Justice Blackmun noted that the nature of human biology was such that "pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied" if a case became moot as soon as the pregnancy ended. "Our law should not be that rigid," he declared. Indeed, he found that "pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" With that settled, the Court turned to the merits of Roe's claim. After reviewing the history of antiabortion legislation, as well as numerous ethical, philosophical, and religious writings on the subject, Blackmun concluded that the laws of most American states, including Texas, were out of touch with medical science and history. More important, he found they violated the Constitution's inherent right to privacy.
Conceding that "the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy," Blackmun cited a dozen or so cases going back more than eighty years to assert that the Constitution protected a right to privacy in a variety of ways. Starting his analysis with early cases such as Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) , and Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891) He concluded, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the district court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." He noted that the state imposed a great burden "upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice," subjecting women to potential medical harms, as well as financial and emotional harms. "Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved."
Blackman next set out a three-stage standard for when abortions might be banned. During the first trimester of a pregnancy, the decision of whether to continue the pregnancy rested entirely with the patient and her physician. During the second trimester, a state had the right to regulate abortions to protect the health and safety of a pregnant woman. Only in the third trimester, did the state gain an interest in preventing an abortion. The reason was that "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications." Blackmun added that a state may proscribe abortion during the third trimester, "except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
The decision was not particularly controversial at the time it was announced. A few states, including the two largest in the nation, California and New York, had already reformed their abortion laws along the lines that Blackmun set out. Other states were considering such legislation. Moreover, the decision in Roe seemed to be the logical conclusion of decisions that had been expanding the rights of women and recognizing changing societal views of the family and childbearing. Roe seemed to be a very modern decision, much like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) , that liberated a large class of people-women-from antiquated laws. There was no immediate large scale public outcry against the decision.
A few years after Roe, the climate changed. Some religious groups-most notably Roman Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants-began a vocal campaign against the decision. Many state legislatures tried to evade Roe, but the Court maintained the core of the decision-that a woman had a right of privacy to determine whether to bear a child. In the three decades following Roe, all national opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans favored keeping abortion safe and legal, even though a substantial, vocal, and sometimes dangerous minority did not.
Scholarly criticism of Blackmun's opinion has come from two directions. Opponents of Roe have compared it to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) , as an example of substantive due process in which the Court substitutes its judgment for that of the states. Critics of this analysis, however, point out that in Lochner the state had protected a relatively powerless group (bakery workers) from an oppressive marketplace, and the Court had struck down the law; in Roe the Court was protecting a group (women, especially poor women) who had little political or economic clout. Some supporters of the outcome in Roe have said that the Court should have decided the case on equal protection grounds. Some feminists have criticized the decision for allowing any regulation by the state of pregnancy, arguing that a woman's "right to choose" was so fundamental that the state could have no legitimate interest in the decision.
Despite the criticism, the three-stage analysis set out by Justice Blackmun has remained. Moreover, most Americans not only accept Roe and the right of women to choose to terminate pregnancies but also that the Constitution protects -or ought to protect-fundamental rights to privacy.
